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The Ducks Stop Here?
The Environmental Challenge to Federalism
Jonathan H.

In Solid Waste Association of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"L the Supre1ne Court
considered whether federal regulatory authority reaches isolated wetlands and ponds due to the potential presence of migratory birds. In
such an expansive view federal
authority, the Court majority underlined its devotion to federalism, despite the dissent's c01nplaint that the decision
would frustrate environmental protection.
This paper argues that SWANNC is not an
to environnwntal protection. There is little reason to
that
interstate competition amongst states will produce a "race
to the bottom" in environmental regulation today, if it ever
did.
presence interstate
can, in certain
,., ... "L''l"'-<i,,"u.L.<~vo, justify federal environmental regulation. Howthe presence
such externalities is
and the
greater than
"vetlands represent public
that are unstates,
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not mean federal regulation.
such as econo1nic incentives or the direct provision
ronn1ental
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The SWANCC majority limited federal power because Confailed to articulate its intent to stretch federal regulatory authority to reach isolated waters. Federal intrusions
into traditional state functions of
must be
of the CWA
clearly stated to be upheld, while
was ambiguous. There are other
as the Endangered '-'IJ~-'""-"/cJ
far-reaching federal authority with
In
cases, the Court. will need to
the argwnent.s
federalism head-on to preserve inter-jurisdictional
competition amongst the states.
INTRODUCTION
There are an estimated 105.5 million acres of wetlands in the United
States.
lands range from mangroves and salt marshes to small
ponds, mudflats and prairie potholes, the vast majority of which are
located on private lands. 2 Federal regulations adopted in the 1970s
limit the use and development of designated wetlands throughout
the nation. At their outer limit, these regulations purport to control
nearly any activity that could result in the "pollution" of wetlands.
rules have been controversial since their inception. Environmental activists question their effectiveness while landowners complain of the costs of compliance. There have even been questions
whether federal wetland regulations exceed the constitutional limits on federal power.
In Solid Waste Association of Northern Cook County v. U.
Corps of Engineers(" SWANCC"), the Supreme Court considered whether federal regulatory authority reaches isolated wetlands
and ponds due to the potential presence of migratory birds. Petitioners, a consortium of local governments, sought to have such regulaThomas E. Dahl, Status and Trends of Wetlands in the Coterminous United
9 (US Fish
Wildlife Service, 2000). The term "wetlands" is used
in this paper to include lands defined
such by one of several federal
agencies that operate wetlands programs, in addition to other,
waters
which might not otherwise be considered wetlands by
or all of these agencies.
Jon Kusler, Wetlands Delineation: An
of
Environ(Mar 1992l.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
the authority to regulate "walkhll·nr·tn"'" or driving a vehicle through
wetland/ 1 though such activities
1993L
Fed Reg 45008, 45020
'This argument made at length in Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and
1

the l'v1enac:e of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation
Envtl L l (1999), from which portions of this article
draw.
121 S Ct 67.S (2001).
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tion of isolated wetlands declared unconstitutional. Voting 5-4, the
Court rejected the expansive view of federal authority, but without
reaching the constitutional question. Instead, the Court held that,
''.::"~"''""" the Clean Water Act (CWA) did not contain a clear indication that Congress sought to reach
outennost limits of its enumerated powers/ the statute would not be construed to authorize
the regulation of isolated, intrastate waters.
With this decision the Court's majority continued the revival of
federalism exemplified by recent cases such as United States v. Loand United States v. Morrison. 7 Those cases held that Congress
had exceeded the enumerated powers granted by the Constitution by
attempting to regulate non-economic intrastate activities. SWANCC
su~~gested, without holding, that Congress might also
those
powers if it sought to regulate isolated waters within a state. By imposing a clear-state1nent requiren1ent on Congress, the Court effectively Inade it n1ore difficult for Congress to test the limits of its
authority in the area of environmental regulation.H Given that the exact limits of
constitutional authority are not easy to specify,
and that congressional intent is not always clear, five Justices have
decided that the risks of impeding Congress' authorized regulatory
activity are outweighed by the need to protect the constitutional
boundaries on congressional power.
The dissent argued that the n1ajority ignored Congress' clear intent and, in the process, exposed millions of acres of wetlands to
destruction. Without challenging the principle that the Constitution limits Congress' authority, the dissent rnaintained that the existence of" externalities" justifies federal regulation in certain fields,
such as environn1ental protection, that otherwise might lie beyond
r..-...--..c.cc· grasp. Underlying the dissent's position is the view that
expansJNe federal regulation is necessary for environmental protection. Specifically, without federal regulation, wildlife habitat will be
irretrievably lost and Americans again will be exposed to "toxic water."9 This view has been echoed in commentary. 10
This article argues that the dissent's concerns are theoretically
and empirically unfounded. There is little reason to believe that interstate competition
states will produce
1

Sl4
549 (1995).
529 US S9R (20001.

In the prior term, the Court unanimously
quirement on
efforts to
""t-hr"·'h' over crime/ Tones v
S29 US H48 (2000) (overturning conviction under
arson statute
due to insufficient neXUS With interstate vU111111'-lvvj
Svv:!\NCC, 121 Ct
<lB4
dissenting).
For
Vermont Law
Patrick Peln"ntPClll
that
SWANCC
decision dealt the "nation1s water quality goals'' a "major
Patrick Parenteau,
Ow Wetland Donnnoe,~, Natl L J
26, 200 l \ at A 18.
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bottom" in environmental regulation today, if it ever did. Interstate
competition is not likely to result in suboptimal environmental protection, at least when compared with the alternative of federal regulation. States will make trade-offs between environmental
tion and other goals that are most consistent with the values of the
people in those states. Moreover, interjurisdictional competition will
promote the discovery of optimal environmental protection strategies. Although the presence of interstate externalities might son1etimes justify federal environmental regulation, such externalities
often are overstated, and the costs of addressing such externalities
through federal regulation may well exceed the benefits of maintaining state primacy Even if federal intervention is justified because states undersupply wetlands, this need not mean federal regulation, as distinguished from economic incentives or the direct
provision of environmental goods. In short, there is little
for
the argument that interstate externalities justify a departure from
the approach to federalism that is now being applied in areas other
than environmental regulation.
The SWANCC majority articulated its federalism rationale without addressing environmental concerns. The opinion rested on the
broad federalism principles underlying the Court's decisions in Lopez, Morrison, and other recent federalism cases. The interpretive
canon employed in this case serves the same purpose as the constitutional doctrine itself. This clear-statement rule, however, will not
prevent the Court from having to face questions about the boundaries of congressional authority to impose environmental regulations. There are other environn1ental statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, which assert extremely far-reaching federal
authority with far less ambiguity than the Clean Water Act. The
Court eventually will have to confront the constitutional issue that
it avoided in SWANCC, as well as the race-to-the-bottom arguments
offered by the SWANCC dissent. When that happens, the Court
should receive such arguments with considerable skepticism.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM

Scarcely two decades ago/ the principles of federalism
to be
a relic in American constitutional law. The New Deal era had seen
a dramatic repudiation of the Supreme Court's previous efforts to
comenforce limits on the scope of Congress' power to
merce, and a later series of decisions had rejected efforts to limit
the national govcrnn1ent's power over the states themselves. 11
The most important
469

us

(

Authority,
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cases "appeared to have signaled the end of judicial federalism and
the demise of the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional limit on
Congress' Commerce Clause powers." Yet reports of federalism's
demise were premature. During the 1990s,
Supreme Court reversed course. Case by case, a slim majority has begun to restore
the constitutional structure of "dual
and enumerated
powers. Continuation of this trend could dramatically redefine the
federal government's role in addressing domestic problems, not least
in environmental affairs.
A. The Doctrine
The Supreme Court's recent federalism cases can be loosely divided
into two groups: enumerated powers cases and state sovereignty
cases. Those in the first group, which are more important for the
subject at hand, focus on whether a federal statute constitutes a
proper exercise of a power delegated to Congress by the Constitution. In these cases, the Court's majority has sought to enforce the
principle that the federal government is one of discrete and limited
powers. In United States v. Morrison, for example, the Supreme
Court struck down a statute that provided a federal civil remedy for
the victin1s of gender-motivated violence against women, concluding that Congress did not have authority to create such a remedy
under the Interstate Commerce Clause 18 or under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Robert H. Freilich and David G. Richardson, Returning
Federalism. Framing a New Tenth Amendment United
Urb Law
(
There have been
notable exceptions to this
in
'-'f:><UU.Lu 6 federal preemption of state law.
for ,_..,.,.... 1.n._,
American Honda
529 US 861
(holding that federal auto
rules preempt state
existence of savings clause).
14
This is
in fuller detail in Comment, The
of Printz: The
Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 Geo Mason L
Rev 573 (1998).
Not all cases fall neatly into one category or the other, and
commentators
have characterized the
somewhat differently.
for example, Michael J. Gerhardt,
Environmental Regulation in Post-Lopez World: Some Questions
and
30 Envtl L Rep 10980 (2000) (categorizing state
immunity
enumerated powers cases under the 14th Amendment).
529 us 598 (2000).
17
42 usc § 13981.
US Canst, Art I,
8, cl
("The Congress shall have Power . . To regulate
Commerce w1th foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.n)
US Const, Amend XIV, ~
("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate
the provisions of this article."). This provision refers to the
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second group of cases deals directly with incidents of state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In
these cases, the Court has considered the extent to which states are
immune to federal government efforts to influence or command
state resources and authority. The Court has invalidated federal statutes that sought to commandeer the use of state officials to implement a federal program, or that required a state legislature to enact
a federally prescribed law. The Court also has limited Congress'
power to abrogate state sovereign in1munity in federal or state court.
All of these cases stress the importance of maintaining an appropriate balance between the state and federal sovereigns, and they
assume that Congress cannot and should not be trusted to restrain
itself from exceeding the proper scope of its own authority.
While both sets of cases have significant implications for environmental protection, the enumerated powers cases are particularly important. For decades, there seemed to be nothing beyond the federal
government's reach under the Commerce Clause. That changed in
1995 with United States v. Lopez, where the Court invalidated the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it illegal to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school. Regulation of guns near schools,
a five justice majority declared, was not within any of the three
broad categories of activity the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate: 1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce;
2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process or deny any person equal protection of the laws.
Printz v United
521 US 898 ( 1997) (holding that Congress may not compel state law enforcement officials to assist in implementing a federal gun control
program!; New Yorl< v United
505 US 144 (holding that Congress may not
compel state legislatures to adopt a specified nuclear waste regulatory program).
See, for
Board of Trustees v
121 S Ct 955 (2001) (without sufficient
findings, sovereign immunity bars private suits against states
under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel Florida Bd of Regents, 528 US
62 (2000l (sovereign immunity bars private suits against states under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999) (sovereign immunity protects states from private suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act in state
College Savings Rank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed Expense Bd, 527
US 666 ( 1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
not
state sovereign
immunityh
of Florida v Florida,
7 US 44 (1996) {Congress lacks
power under Article I to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
The beginning of this period
marked by
v
Corp 301 US 1
Congress's power to regulate terms of employment
and labor relations agreements
part of its commerce power under the National
Labor Relations Act).
514 US S49 (1995).
18 usc

Jonathan H. Adler

211

in interstate commercei and 3) those activities that "substantially
affect" interstate cmnmerce.
The first two prongs of this Lopez framework are reasonably
straightforward. If something is sold or used in interstate commerce,
it can be regulated. Less obvious is what intrastate activities are subject to federal regulation because they "substantially affect" interstate cmnmerce. Virtually all kinds of activity have the potential
substantially to affect interstate commerce through their indirect
effects. Thus, for example, the widespread presence of guns in schools
could adversely affect the educational environment, thus reducing
the future productivity of the students and thereby eventually iinpacting interstate commerce. Yet as the Lopez Court recognized,
were the Court to accept this argument, it would be "hard pressed
to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power
to regulate.
The
to understanding the "substantial affects" test is that it
examines the comn1ercial nature of the activity as well as the activity's effect on commerce. Just because insomnia has a significant national economic impact, it does not follow that the Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate our sleeping habits. Rather,
the question is whether the activity to be regulated is itself related
to commerce/ or any sort of economic enterprise" or whether the
regulation is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activitYt in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated. In other words, the activity
n1ust be "economic in nature" for the enactment to pass muster.
Thus, the regulation of industrial mining activity is a permissible
regulation of commerce, as is a national price maintenance regime
for agricultural products. 31 Federal regulation of domestic violence
or gun possession near schools, however, is not regulable merely because these activities Inay have a significant economic effect. While
refusing to adopt a" categorical rule," the Morrison Court noted that
111

Sl4USat
169 F3d 820 1

Cir 19991
and $107.S billion per
aff' d sub nom

Virgini£1
Mining
4S2 US 264 (1981)
(upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act).
Wickard
31 US 111 1942) (forbidding production of agricultural
products
self-use
national
of the Agricultural AdjustAct ot 19381.
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{{thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce
...__,.._,:Luc·~ regulation of intrastate activity
where that
is
economic in nature.
Pervading the Supreme Court's federalist jurisprudence is the idea
that some governmental functions are
provided by the federal
government, while the rest should be performed at the state and
local
As Justice O'Connor noted in New York v. United States,
"[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to
the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by
the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution
has not conferred on Congress.
State and federal governments each have areas in which they specialize. According to Hamilton:
The administration of private justice between the citizens of
the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are
proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. 34
Concern with preserving to the states some portion of their traditional jurisdiction is a common refrain in the Supreme Court's recent cases. In
for example, the Court noted that both criminal law and education were traditional functions of state and local
governments, along with family law. 35 In 1982 the Supreme Court
declared regulation of land use a "quintessential state activity."·16
To preserve the system of dual sovereignty, the courts must police
each sovereign's boundaries. The federal government must be constrained to operate within its constitutionally prescribed limits,
while states are prevented from disrupting national1narkets. Otherwise, were "the Federal Government to take over the regulation of
entire areas of traditional state concern, having nothing to do with
the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the
spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory." 17
US at 609
added).
York, 505 US
156.
The Federalist No. I 7, at 1S6
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick cd 1987).
primary
14 US at S61 n3 ( Under our federal system, the 'States
ut:r:tnnlg and
the criminal law.
v Isaac, 456
US 107 12R (
id at 564-6S (noting that law enforcement/ education and family
law are matters traditionally left to the
id at S80 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(uit
well established that education
a traditional concern of the
citing
us 104 (1968)).
ML~:sisi~ip[)i, 456 US 742, 768 n30 (
concurring).
Morrison,

11

1
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B. The Rationale
Both the state sovereignty and enumerated powers strands of the
Court's federalism jurisprudence are grounded in the notion "dual
sovereignty." The division of authority between the federal and state
governments is even n1ore fundamental than the separation of powers among the branches of the federal government. As the Court
explained in Gregory
· "Just as the separation and independence
the coordinate branches of Federal Governtnent serve
to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch,
a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front." 3 H Moreover, a decentralized federal system produces government that is ' more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society" and "more responsive by putting States in competition for
a mobile citizenry." 39
Perhaps the strongest argument for reserving substantial power
to the states is that local tastes, conditions, and concerns will vary
from place to place. Demographic variation, localized culture, differing geography; and varied economic strengths mean that one-sizefits-all approaches to policy too often fit nobody. Leaving substantial
power in the hands of state and local governments helps those governmental units do a better job of matching local government policies with the tastes and preferences of local citizens than a national
government could do. At the same time, decentralization enables a
mobile citizenry to move to those areas where government policies
(and other factors) are most in line with their own preferences.
Consider the following example suggested by Michael McConnelL A nation is made up of two states/ A and B. Each state has
100
70 percent of those in State A, and 40
of those
in State B, favor banning smoking in public buildings. The reInaining residents of each state oppose the ban. If a decision is 1nade
by popular vote at the national level, smoking in public buildings is
banned by a vote of 110 to 90. However, if each state decides its own
smoking policy by majority vote, the ban passes in State A, 70-30,
but fails in State B, 40-60. Thus, 130 of the 200 residents are satisfied with the policy choice. The division of the nation into two
states results in the satisfaction of 20 n1ore people than would have
occurred were policy n1ade at the national leveL If people are mobile, even more people could be satisfied by moving to the state
where the policy matches their personal preference. Assuming that
1

501 us 452, 458 (1991 ).
Id at
Michael W McConnell,
L Rev 1484 1494 (1987).
1

U Chi
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as few as ten percent of people will move from a state with a disfavored policy to a state with a favored policy increases the number of
satisfied citizens to 13 7 of 200.
their
In the real world, of course, people seldom if ever
state of residence solely because of relatively trivial policy issues
like the one in this hypotheticaL But they may relocate in response
to more significant policy choices, and there may be correlations
among various preferences. Thus, for example, the same people who
object to smoking in public buildings may share numerous other
preferences, while those who favor smoking in public buildings may
share contrary preferences among then1selves. As a result, differing
policy choices by state governments can have powerful effects at
the margin. 41
This dynamic-states' ability to adopt policies in line with local
r"''""'""" .... ~"''".. """'"'' and citizens' ability to move to states with policies they
prefer-leads to the second argument for federalist syste1n: interjurisdictional competition. States compete for citizens by offering
differing mixes of taxes, services, and regulations. This reinforces
heterogeneity of tastes across states and homogeneity of tastes within
states. Thus, public policy will vary from state to state, particularly
in areas where there is no clearly optimal policy choice. Moreover,
dispersing power and authority away from the central government
and removing barriers to interstate competition constrain government's ability to maintain rent-seeking policies.
The decentralization of authority also encourages state experimentation. In Justice Brandeis' famous words: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratoryi and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 44 Such
experimentation results from the possibility of competition among
jurisdictions, just as it does from competition between buyers and
Sec, for example, Margaret F. Brinig & F H. BuckleYr The Market for Deadbeats.
25 J Leg Stud 201, 209-lO (1996)
that higher welfare payouts
and
correlated with immigration and significantly and
correlated with emigration); F. H.
Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets.
for the Top,
Sup Ct Econ Rev 141, 169 (1997) (evidence
that states
generous welfare benefits
to attract immigrants who
to support the dominant
coalition).
Charles M. Tiebout,
of Local
Pol Econ 416, 422 (1956!.
Barry R. Weingast, The
Economic
Liebmann,
Steven G. Calahresi,
ated Powers' In Defense of United States
LL'.'l""'lllL
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sellers in the marketplace. States essentially sell places to live, work,
and produce goods, and will respond to market pressures. When the
federal government intrudes into areas of traditional state concern,
it 1'forecloses the States from experimenting and
their own
judgment in an area to which States lay claiin by right of history
and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the
realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.
It is, of course, true that decentralization is not an entirely unmixed blessing. Most importantly in the present context, the benefits
of decentralization cannot easily be disentangled from the structural
incentives it creates for the production of negative externalities and
free riding. Sorting out these costs and benefits is among the n1ost
difficult and important questions in the field of environmental regulation, and it provided the main basis for the dispute between the
majority and the dissent in SWANCC.

II. SWANCC v. CORPS OF ENGINEERS
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U. S. Army
Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), the Court confronted the scope
of federal regulatory authority over wetlands and other "waters of
the United States" under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 47 Prior to
SWANCC, the Supreme Court had never struck down a federal environmental enactment or agency regulation for exceeding the commerce power. Yet it was only a matter of time before the Supreme
Court would have to consider how the principles enunciated in Lopez applied in this field. Though the court's majority ducked the
ultimate issue of whether federal regulations of isolated waters exceed the constitutional scope of federal power, it reaffirmed the vitality of its federalism principles in the context of environmental
protection.

A. Regulatory Background
The CWA was enacted "to restore and maintain the chen1ical, physiSection 404
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.
regulates the discharge of material into "navigable waters"-simply
514 US at 583
concurring).
USC§§ 1251-1385
The ~~clean Water Ace' the conventional name
for the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
4
v United
505 US 144 1992L however, the Court did strike
B In New
down portions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
on federalism grounds. Sec note 20 and accompanying text.
4
" 33 USC
1251\a).
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defined as "waters of the United States." 5° It prohibits the "discharge
of any pollutant" -defined to include dredged n1aterial, rock, sand,
and solid or industrial waste-into navigable waters without a federal permit. Section 404 authorizes the U.S. Army Corps of
neers to issue such permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.
Federal regulations promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers 53
define "waters of the United States" to include 1) all waters used
for interstate commerce;" 4 2) all interstate waters and wetlands;"" 3)
all tributaries or impoundments of such waterss 6 ; and, most significandy:
all other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams, mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet tneadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds) the use, degradation, or destruction of which could atinterstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers
for recreational or other purposes; or (ii) From which fish or
shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign
commerce; or (iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by industries in interstate commerce.
This definition explicitly includes "wetlands adjacent to waters
(other than waters that are themselves wetlands)."""
The Supreme Court considered the scope of the Corps' regulatory
authority in the 1985 case of United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, in which a developer challenged federal jurisdiction over
"wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries" as exceeding the limits of the CWA. 60 The Court rejected this
argument, finding that Congress sought "to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that

usc§ 1362 (7).
USC
(6), 13ll(al.
USC§ 1344 (a). Approval of permit hy the Corps is suhject to the EPA's veto
USC
Additionally. the Corps must give the Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Marine Fisheries Service and the head of the fish and wildlife
in the relevant state the opportunity
comment on permit apr>licatH)ns.
The EPA has parallel regulations. 40 CFR §~I l 0
CFR§
(a)(l).
CFR
(a)(2).
CFR
(a)(4), (5).
CFR §
la/1,1/ICmpnasis added).
CFR §
The regulatory definition excludes prior converted eropCFR §
us 121 (
Riverside Bayv1ew Homes, 474 tJS at 123.
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would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding
of that term.
In particular, the Court upheld "the Corps' conclusion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the United States, and therefore are subject to the Corps'
regulatory authority under
CWA. Yet the Court did not
the Corps carte blanche authority to
wetlands. It explicitly
did not address whether the Corps/ authority extended to cover
"wetlands not necessarily adjacent to other waters, and paid little
attention to what, if an)j limits the Cmnmerce Clause placed on the
Corps' authority to regulate wetlands.
The Anny Corps, however, did not see any limits on its jurisdiction. The year following Riverside Bayview Homes, the Corps published its interpretation of its authoritYt commonly referred to as
the "migratory bird rule/' 64 which stated that the Corps' regulatory
authority extends to intrastate waters:
a) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treatiesi or
b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which come across state
or
c) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
d) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
The Corps thereby effectively asserted its regulatory authority over
all territory meeting the definition of waters or wetlands throughout
the United States.
B. The SWANCC Litigation
This case arose out of localities'
to dispose of their trash.
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) was
Id at
Id at ,) 1. In reaching this
the Court relied upon the proposition
that
agency's .construction of a statute it charged with enforcing is entitled to
deference if it
reasonable and not
conflict with the
intent of Con-

Homes at 124 n 2.
the ''migratory bird interpretation," as the
Corps' interpretation
issued without
the notice and comment proccdun:.:s required under the Section .S:13 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See
SWANCC, 121 Ct at 67H n 1.
"n1•1nr•u;

1

''51 FedReg41217(lYH6).

Unless
noted, the summary of the facts is taken from the opinion of
the federal district court in SWANCC v l JS Army Corps of
998 F.Supp.
Y46 (ND Ill 1998), aff'd 191 F:id 84S (7th Cir 1999); rev'd 121 S Ct 675 (200lL
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a municipal corporation formed by 23 local jurisdictions in northern
Illinois for the purpose of siting and
a solid waste disposal
facility. For this project, SWANCC purchased a 533-acre parcel
straddling Cook and Kane Counties, previously used for gravel mining. SWANCC intended to use the site to construct a balefUl-that
a landfill for disposing of baled, non-hazardous solid waste. Much
of the parcel consisted of mining pits and other depressions that
filled with water, creating permanent or seasonal ponds. In 1986 and
1987, SWANCC asked the Army Corps whether portions of the
balefill site were subject to federal regulation under the CWA due to
the presence of "apparent wetlands.
On each occasion, the Corps
issued a letter stating that the site contained no wetlands subject to
federal regulation and that therefore the federal government did not
have jurisdiction over the site.
In July 1987, the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission claimed
that four different species of migratory birds had been observed at
the site, prompting the Corps to reconsider its determination that
the SWANCC balefill site was beyond its regulatory jurisdiction.
Armed with this new information, the Corps reversed course and
asserted jurisdiction over SWANCC's parcel due to its potential to
serve as waterfowl habitat. The Corps never claimed that there was
any hydrological connection between the portions of the site that
SWANCC sought to develop and broader hydrological systems. Nonetheless, the Corps denied SWANCC's request for a permit to fill17.6
acres of the 533-acre site, and SWANCC sued.
Neither the trial court nor the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
was persuaded by SWANCC's argument that isolated waters were
beyond the permissible scope of federal authority. 68 Both courts reasoned that the assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over isolated waters on the basis that migratory birds might use such land as a habitat posed no constitutional difficulty under Lopez. While the filling
of fewer than two-dozen acres of isolated waters or wetlands might
have a negligible economic impact, r'the destruction of the natural
habitat of migratory birds in the aggregate 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.
The Seventh Circuit cited government estimates that over 3 million Americans spent an estimated $1.3 billion
dollars hunting migratory birds in 1996, and "about 11 percent of
them traveled across state lines to do so." 70 Over ten million more
traveled across state lines to birdwatch. On this basis, the Seventh

71

998 F Supp at 948.
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Circuit affirmed the lower court and held that "the destruction of
migratory bird habitat and the attendant decrease in the populations
of these birds 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court reversed, though without reaching the constitutional question. Instead/ the Court employed a clear-statement rule,
Ashcroft, under which ambiguous
first developed in
statutes are read narrowly when a broader interpretation would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.
Given the importance of the Constitution's underlying federalist
structure, the Court 1nade clear that it would find that Congress
sought to reach the outer bounds of its Commerce Clause power
only where the statutory language Inandates such a result. Upsetting the federalist balance requires "a clear indication that Congress
intended that result." Congress bears the burden to enact statutory
language that leaves no question that it intended to displace state
efforts in the area before an executive agency can assert such authority.
In each case construing Congress' enumerated powers, the Court
can make two possible errors. First, the Court could uphold a federal
action that exceeds Congress' delegated authority. Conversely, the
Court could invalidate a federal action that is actually within Congress' enumerated powers. In relying upon a canon of statutory interpretation that places the onus upon Congress to assert its intention to expand federal power, the SWANCC majority made clear its
preference for avoiding the former error at the risk of committing
more of the latter. Furthermore/ by requiring a clear statement, the
Court effectively raises the cost to Congress of
its rightful
authority to upset the traditional federal-state balance, thus helping
to prevent Congress from exercising its power too lightly. The Court
has said that "Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated
by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system.
It is a power that we must assume Congress does not exercise
lightly." 75
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 to "restore and maintain the
Id .
.SOl US at 460-61 (requiring a ' 1 clear statement" of LoJagr,ess:tonai intent
empt state authority).
SWANCC, 121 Ct at
) (stating that, unless ,__,uu;;•~""
to have sigmhcarltly
·.c

pre-
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chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 7 r'
To this end, the 1972 Act imposed technology-based effluent standards on industry and expanded funding for municipal sewage treatment. It also
permits for discharge of effluents or other
materials into waters of the United States. However, states that 1net
certain requirements became eligible to assume responsibility for
administering the various permitting programs under federal supernot only expanded federal wavision. As the Court noted,
ter quality efforts, it also sought to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to
plan the develop1nent and use (including restoration, preservation and enhancen1ent) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Adn1inistrator in the exercise of his authority.
The Court was not convinced by the Corps' interpretation of its
authority to include all waters, including wetlands, irrespective of
their size, navigability, or location. As noted above, CWA section
404(a) authorizes the Corps to regulate the discharge of fill material
into "navigable waters," defined as "waters of the United States. ?H
The Court extended this definition no further than wetlands and
other waters adjacent to navigable waters. While the Court would
normally defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers under the Chevron doctrine, the Court refused to do so
here. "Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes
the outer limits of Congress' power" the Court demands a "clear indication that Congress intended that result."~>o The Court found insufficient evidence in the text or legislative history to conclude that
Congress sought to reach "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters," in either the 1972 Act or amendments passed in 1977. Despite the Corps' insistence to the contrary, the Court found no clear
indication that "navigable waters" include "isolated ponds, some
only seasonal, wholly located within two Illinois counties.
While the Court did not directly address the Constitutional question, it noted that where an assertion of federal authority "alters the
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroach1nent upon a

SvVANCC. 12 I S Ct at 683
Coast Building
Contr. Trades
Id at 6H2-R3.
Id
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traditional state power" it is particularly reluctant to stretch the
bounds of Congress' delegated power. The majority noted that allowing the Corps "to clain1 federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the /Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and prin1ary power over
land and water use. To avoid this result, the court interpreted the
statute narrowly. The Court thereby adopted a decision rule designed to minimize the likelihood that it would erroneously compron1ise the federalist design, hut at the sa1ne time failed to resolve
whether federal regulation of isolated wetlands is beyond constitutional bounds. One year earlier, a unanimous Court applied the
same principle to overturn a federal arson prosecution where there
was no clear connection to interstate commerce, lest it adopt a statutory interpretation that would leave "hardly a [parcel of ]land ...
outside the federal statute's domain. If the Court is to resolve this
issue, it will take a clear act
and not an administrative
interpretation of a broad yet ambiguous statutory scheme.
Before discussing the environmental aspects of the Court's decision/ it is worth noting that the Court's insistence on a "clear statement" of Congressional intent to intrude upon traditional state
powers would seem to be particularly appropriate where it is an
agency interpretation, and not the underlying authorizing statute,
which is at issue. This is because the legislature can be expected to
be more solicitous of state concerns than an executive agency. As
the Court noted in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Autlwrity, 116 the political system contains "built in restraints'/ resulting
from ' state participation in federal governmental action" that work
to limit federal intrusion in local matters. Members of ,._,~. ~ ......".!""'""~
are more responsive to the concerns of local regional concerns than
centralized regulatory
oversight could, in
theory, reign in regulatory actions that run roughshod over federalism concerns, but this is unlikely to be an effective limit. Indeed,
Court's federalism jurisprudence stands for the propoinsofar as
sition that courts must safeguard federalism, this proposition should
operate at its strongest in the context administrative actions that
do not directly respond to an explicit
cmnmand.
1

Id at 683.
Id at
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation
US
,)0, 44 (1994)
1\-h'-'><'ll\JU of land
a function traditionally performed
by local governments).
jones v United States, 20 Ct 1904, 1911 (2000).
1
'
4Ci9 US
(1985).
~ Id at
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III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE
TO FEDERALISM
Justice Stevens in dissent accused the SWANCC majority of /{needlessly weaken[ing] our principal safeguard against toxic water."H 8
The dissent argues that using federalism doctrines to limit federal
regulatory authority over environmental matters risks ecological
ruin. Only federal regulatory intervention can prevent the destruction of the aquatic environment" and ensure that '[o]ur Nation's
waters no longer burn. A given pond or wetland may be isolated
hydrologically from other waters, but migratory waterfowl and other
species connect such places with the broader ecosystein. In this regard, the dissent echoes much current commentary on the proper
role of the federal government in environmental protection. 90
The argument for broad federal power to regulate environmental
n1atters is grounded in a concern over interstate externalities. If the
federal government is constrained by a narrow reading of its enumerated powers, there is a concern that states will be unable or unwilling to account for the effect that their regulatory decisions have
upon other states or the nation as a whole. As the dissent explains:
11

1

The destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat, like so many
other environmental problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g. a new landfill) are disproportionately local, while many
of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds) are widely dispersed
and often borne by citizens living in other States. In such situations, described by economists as involving 'externalities,' federal regulation is both appropriate and necessary. 91
The dissent cites two authorities for this analysis. The first is an
article by Professor Richard Revesz arguing, among other things,
that "[t]he presence of interstate externalities is a powerful reason
for intervention at the federal level. The second is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining eJ Reclamation Association, which upheld the
SWANCC 121 S Ct at 684 (Stevens, Ult>:~enunJ;/. Justice Stevens was joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter.
Id at 684.
'-'""""'Uf"·"• Oliver A. Houck and Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands
COJ'1SU1ert1tlc>n of
Water
404
to the
54 Md L Rev 1242, 1244 (1995) (stating that it
obvious
when the CWA was enacted 'that the national interest in clean
water and related wetlands functions merits a strong federal presence.").
SWANCC 121 Ct at 695 (Stevens, dissenting).
Richard L Revesz,
Interstate Competition:
67 NYU LRev
'Race-to-the-Bottom·
1210, 1222
1
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Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act against a Commerce
Clause challenge. The dissent notes that Hodel deferred to Confinding that nationwide standards were "essential" in order
to avoid "destructive interstate competition 11 that could undermine
environmental standards. Ironicall~ much of Revesz's academic
work has been devoted to challenging the conventional justifications for federal environmental regulation/ including that advanced
by Hodel. Indeed, the central thesis of the article the dissent cites
is that "destructive interstate competition" cannot justify federal environmental regulation.
The analytical confusion of the dissent notwithstanding, "externalities," as used by the dissent, embraces three separate arguments
that might be made to justify federal regulation of the environment
under some conditions, including isolated waters as in SWANCC.
First
is the perennial concern that leaving environmental protection to states will generate a "race to the bottom" as states relax
environmental protections to compete with one another for industrial development. Second, activity in one state may result in an
interstate "spillover" as pollution or some other ill effect is imposed
on another jurisdiction. Third, insofar as an environmental resource,
such as waterfowl habitat, has the characteristics of a public good,
states may underinvest in its protection.
A. Race-to-the-Bottom
The race-to-the-bottom theory presumes that interjurisdictional
competition creates a prisoner's dilemma for states. Each state
wants to attract industry for the economic benefits that it provides.
to maintain an optimal level of environmenEach state also
tal protection. However, in order to attract industr~ the theory
holds, states will lower environmental safeguards so as to reduce the

Hodel, 452 US at 281-82) (Stevens, dlslsentmlslRcvesz, 67 NYU L Rev 1210 (cited in note 92)i Richard Revesz 1
Bottom
Minn L Rev
( 1997); Richard Revesz,
Cntique, in John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, eds,
He
97-127 (Hoover
1997)
Critique"t
Richard
and
Environmental Externalities.
U Pa L
Rev 2341 ( 1996).
Revesz, 67 NYU L Rev at 1211 (cited in note 92).
v See for
Ronald McKinnon &. Thomas
Competition in FedThe Role of Politict1l and Financial Constraints. in John Ferejohn and
Barry R. Weingast, eds,
New
· Can the
Trusted! (Hoover
1997) (noting the three distinct ways externalities may arise under federalism).
1
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regulatory burden they impose upon firms. This competition exerts
downward pressure on environmental safeguards as firms
to
locate in states where regulatory burdens are the lowest, and states
to attract industry by
the economic burden of environmental safeguards. Because the potential benefits of lax regulation are concentrated among relatively few firms, these firms can
effectively oppose the general public's preference for environmental
protection regulation. As one commentator explained, "[i]f each
locality reasons the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there were some binding
mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development." 100 This will lead to social welfare losses even if environmental harm does not spill over from one state to another.
The race-to-the-bottmn argument is probably the most cmnmon
argument for federal environmental regulation, particularly for
wholly or largely intrastate environmental problems, such as local
air or water quality. 101 But despite its currency, the theory has come
under substantial fire. Revesz, the most prominent critic of the raceto-the-bottom theory, notes that environmental regulation is one of
several respects in which states compete for business. Firm siting
and relocation decisions are a function of numerous considerations
apart from environmental regulation, ranging from taxes and infrastructure to the cost and skill base of the local workforce, to other
regulatory policies. Moreover, for many citizens, stronger environmental protections are a reason to move to a state, a fact that creates
pressures not to reduce environmental standards. 103 This likely offsets race-to-the-bottom pressures, particularly since the same citiYH See, for example, Daniel C. Esty,
Environmental Federalism, 95
MichL Rev 570, 603-04 (1996).
See
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective
Public Goods
the
(Harvard U, 1965 ). Proponents of the race-to-the-bottom theory
also suggest that environmental advocates will have
political inHuencc at the
state and local level than at the national level. See, for
Richard B. Stewart,
l'urnrnll1c of
Problems of
in Mandating State lm.plemenumc;n
of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L J l
1213
Esty, Revitalizing
at 597-99
in note 98l. Note that other groups may be effective advocates
regulation, in part because of state competition for residents and industry. See text
note 127.
Yale L J at 1212 (cited in note 99).
eX<JlmJ)le, Hodel. 452 US at 281-82
at lOS (cited in note
'"""'' ....'--''n" have flocked to some western states that
usc aggressive measures to protect the
the fact that these
impose
costs on business and taxpayers." Deborah Jones Merritt,
94 MichL Rev 674, 70<l ( 1995).
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zens that demand environ1nental protection make up the workforce
that companies seek.
More fundamentally, Revesz detnonstrates that while
theoretic interactions an1cmg the states could lead to underregulation
federal intervention ... it is equally plausible that in
other instances the reverse would
true: that gan1e-theoretic interactions among the states would lead to ovcregulation.
For instance, if states determine that tax policy has a greater impact on
firm siting decisions than environmental regulation, and interjurisdictional competition is assmned to generate a race-to-the-bottom,
states will adopt tax rates on capital that are suboptimal because
they are less than the cost of providing the infrastructure that capital requires. In this scenario it may be preferable for each state to
adopt
stringent environn1ental regulations to prevent excessive industrial development.
Yet if each state follows this
course, the result is too much regulation/ not too little.
The race-to-the-bottom argument also questionably assumes that
federal intervention will solve the problem of chronic state underregulation. Because states compete for businesses on many fronts,
establishing a federal tninimum standard in one area simply shifts
the cmnpetitive pressures into other arenas, such as tax policy or
tort law. If reducing govern1nental burdens on business is necessary
to attract corporate investment, and states will race to the bottom,
establishing minimal environmental
does not prevent
the race fron1 occurring, it Inerely shifts the policy area in which it
occurs. 106 Instead of adopting suboptin1al environmental regulations,
states will compete by enacting suboptimal workplace or consumer
protections. Thus, the race-to-the-bottom argu1nent could just as
easily become an argu1nent for nationalizing all areas of public policy that affect corporate
decisions. It
in Revesz's words, a
11
frontal attack 11 on federalisn1.
In support of the race-to-the-bottmn theory, commentators point
to survey data indicating that state policy makers consider the relaxation of regulatory standards to attract industrial investment n1ore
frequently than cmnpanies alter their siting decisions based upon
j()?
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environmental regulations. One study reported survey results indicating that "a substantial minority of states relax their environmental standards in order to attract industrial firms. w9 Yet the
mere fact that state officials ease the burden environmental regulations impose on business does not necessarily mean that the welfare
loss from the regulatory relaxation is greater than the welfare gain
of increased economic activity. More fundamentally, this argument
assumes an identity between the level of environmental protection
and the costs imposed upon business. In other words, an environmental policy that makes a state more attractive to industry by reducing the costs of compliance with environmental rules does not
necessarily compromise environmental protection.
An obvious example of how more lenient environmental rules are
not necessarily inconsistent with environmental protection is the
replacement of a command-and-control technology mandate with a
performance standard. Mandating the use of a given technology or
even imposing percentage emission reductions on a given industry
may produce widely divergent costs across firms. Some firms will
find it less expensive to reduce emissions through some means other
than that mandated by law, perhaps by making different modifications to the production process. For example, under then-existing
air pollution regulations, Amoco's refinery in Yorktown, Virginia
had to spend approximately $40 million to reduce emissions of
VOCs (volatile organic compounds) in the manner the law required.
Yet in a top-to-bottmn audit of the facility conducted with the cooperation of the Environmental Protection Agency, Amoco discovered
that the facility could have generated the same emission reduction
at one quarter of the cost had the facility merely been required to
meet an environmental benchmark. 110
Other firms may find it cheaper still to mitigate the environmental impact of their emissions by paying for emission reductions elsewhere. For instance, the imposition of a watershed or airshed-wide
emission trading scheme tnay allow polluting companies to reduce
their costs of compliance by paying for emission reductions by other
firms with lower costs. Consider two companies that each emit 20
Sec Kirsten H. Engel,
a
and Is It
the Rottom "I. 48 Hastings L J
not, however,
purport
document declines in envmmmcntal quality resulting from such interjurisdictional competition. Rather, it assumes that reducing the stringency of environmental regulation
compromises environmental protection. Yet this
sumption is unwarranted/
discussed below.
109
Id at 279.
110 Ronald E. Schmitt,
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units of pollution per year at a cost to Firm A of $20 per unit and to
Firm B of $30 per unit. If a regulation requires each company to
reduce its emissions by 25 percent, the total cost of the emission
reductions will be $250 [(5 x $20) + (5 x $30) ]. However the same
emission reductions could be achieved by allowing Firm B to comply by paying Firm A to reduce its emissions by five additional units,
thereby producing the emission reductions for $200 [ (5 x $20) + (5
x $20) L or 20 percent lower cost. Indeed, under such a regime it
could be possible to reduce emissions by two additional units at a
lower cost than under the command-and-control regitne.
This is not to say that such policy reforms will always be more
cost-effective or available or that states will consistently adopt such
policies if given the chance. It simply undercuts a key premise upon
which the race-to-the-bottom theory relies-that reducing business'
cost of environmental regulation must come at the expense of environmental protection.
It is also important to recognize that the trade-off between environmental protection and compliance costs will not remain constant over time. State policy makers and bureaucrats can, given the
proper incentives, develop new means of reducing the severity of the
trade-off. Interjurisdictional competition, by forcing states to compete for both industry and residents, encourages this process. A state
that wishes to provide a greater level of environmental protection
to its citizens but does not want to create a less friendly investment
climate for business will seek to adopt new types of environmental
protection that do a superior job of meeting both goals. Interjurisdictional competition thus spurs a policy discovery process through
which new means of reconciling environmental and economic concerns are developed and adopted.
Like the race-to-the-bottom argument, empirical
that
suggests the theory is flawed is not new. In the early part of the
twentieth century, when the Supreme Court first struggled with the
constitutional limits on the exercise of Congress's commerce power,
proponents of an expansive interpretation argued that federal regulation was necessary to protect the weak and disenfranchised from
the vagaries of the market. Thus, in 1916 Congress
a law
prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods produced in plants that
e1nployed children under the age of 14. 111 When challenged in the
Supreme Court two years later, the government warned that without
the law "[t]he shipment of child-made goods outside of one State
directly induces similar employment of children in competing
1

Act of Sept. 1, 1916 ch 4,12,
hours that children between the

Stat
The law also limited the number of
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states." 112 Yet at the time
State in the Union" had a law regulating child labor. 1
The race-to-the-bottom theory is no better at predicting state regulatory behavior in the context of environmental protection than it
was with child labor. If the race-to-the-bottom theory were accurate,
one would expect states to lag behind the federal government in developing programs to protect wetlands, and states with the greatest
proportion of wetlands to
slower to protect wetlands than those
with a lower proportion of wetlands. Assutning that limiting the use
and development of wetlands imposes costs on industry and discourages economic investment, these costs will be greatest in states
with the
proportion of wetlands that might be burdened by
regulation. At the same time, the n1arginal cost of developing an
acre of wetlands will be
in states with the
proportion
of wetlands because such development will have a smaller proportionate impact on that state's wetland inventory and, presumably,
the ecological benefits that the wetlands provide. From this one can
outline a testable hypothesis: "As a general rule, the larger a state's
wetland inventory, the more important it is to the nation, but the
less important saving it may appear to the state itself-indeed, the
more onerous the burden of protecting it will appear."
The history of state wetland regulation, however, paints quite a
different picture. Not only did states not wait for the federal government to begin regulating wetlands, but the order in which state began to act is the precise opposite of what the race-to-the-bottom
theory would predict. Fifteen states have more than ten percent of
their land area in wetlands, according to the National Wetland Inventory.1 All of these states but Alaska enacted their first wetland
protection statutes prior to
when a federal court declared that
the CWA applied to wetlands. 116 Moreover, most of these states have
some protections for inland wetlands, in addition to coastal wetHammer v Dagenhart. 247 US 2Sl 256-57 (1918). A similar race-to-the-bottom
argument was made by the government in defense of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
ALA. Schechter Poultry
v United States. 295 US 495, S49 (l93S ).
Hammer, 247 US at 27S
added). The Supreme Court struck down
the statute for exceeding the scope of
Commerce Clause power, but this
decision was
overturned in
States v Darby. 12 US 100 (1941 ).
Houck and Rolland,
Md L Rev at 1253 (cited in note 90).
Jon. A. Kusler, et al,
Wetland Regulation:
t:mergmg Trends
Table 1 (Association of State Wetland Managers. 1':l94\ ("Kusler,
These
are Alabama; Alaska, Delaware, Florida,
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Minnesota Mississippi, New
Jersey/ North Carolina, South Carolina/ and Wisconsin.
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lands. As noted in a recent review of state efforts, "most of the
states with the largest wetland acreages have adopted wetland regulatory efforts for all or a portion of their wetlands." 1 States with
a lower proportion of wetlands generally enacted state regulatory
programs later, if at all. This is the exact opposite of what the raceto-the-bottom theory would predict.
The race-to-the-bottom theory
not only that states with
the most wetlands would regulate last, but also that few states
would regulate in excess of federal requirements. This would drive
investments to other states just as would state regulation in the absence of federal regulation. Moreover, once the federal government
regulates/ states are likely to devote their resources to those areas
not already occupied by the federal government where state efforts
are likely to generate greater marginal returns both to the state as a
whole and to politicians who need not share credit with federal officials.
Despite incentives not to act, many states have adopted programs
that reach beyond federal wetlands regulations as implemented prior
to SWANCC. Several states regulate sizable buffer zones, and not
just the wetlands themselves. The Maryland Department of the Environn1ent, for instance, regulates buffer zones for nontidal wetlands of between 25 and 100
New York's statute protects a
100-foot buffer zone that local governments may extend. Federal
regulations contain no such protections. In addition, some states
have sought to develop non-regulatory progra1ns to supplement or
substitute for regulatory programs. States also are taking the lead
in developing systems for classifying wetlands and evaluating their
functions. Despite the supposedly greater sophistication and techat the federal level, there is little
that the
nical
Wetland
at 3 (cited in note I 1
Analysis of Nontidal Wetland Regulation
Maryland, 16 Va
Note,
Envtl LJ 459, 477 (l
11
Patricia Riexinger, Local Implementation of New York:s rresnvvarei Wet"
lands Act, in Wetland
the
of the
(Ass'n State
Wetland Managers,
227, 229 ("Ricxingcr, Local Implementation").
See Note, 16 Va Envtl LJ at 477 (cited in note 118) (stating that 1'[r]q,rulation of
activities in the huffer
unique to
law, and
not found in the section
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Corps systematically considers wetland function in the regulatory
process.
If the race-to-the-bottom cannot explain this trend, what can?
One possibility is suggested by the work of Nobel Prize winning
economist F. A. Hayek, who noted that much valuable knowledge is
particular to time and place. Not until late in the twentieth century were wetlands valued for their ecological functions or the focus
substantial conservation efforts. Not until the 1970s was there
widespread recognition of the ecological functions that wetlands
provide, including water filtration and flood mitigation, as well as
their value for waterfowl and other wildlife habitat. Most of these
benefits are localized. Therefore, the greatest beneficiaries of wetland protection efforts would be those closest to the wetlands. Similarly, knowledge of the specific ecological functions provided by
wetlands in a given region likely also would be localized. This puts
state and local officials in a better position to address environmental
concerns than federal officials in a centralized regulatory bureaucracy. In the words of one local official, there is "a need for a community perspective not because local governments are more perfect,
but because they are more local." 126 Therefore, one possible explanation for the pattern of wetland regulation could be that states with
the most wetlands were most aware of the ecological values played
by local wetlands. This also would explain why many localities
choose to regulate wetlands even more stringently than their respective state governments.
the Clean
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It also should be the case that insofar as wetlands and other ecological goods provide economic benefits, industries and interests
that rely upon these benefits will organize and lobby for greater protection. Industry is not a monolith. Although commercial developers may suffer from wetland regulation, other industries, such as
tourism, and fishing, may benefit. Protecting ecological resources in
some areas may also increase property values, thereby increasing
rather than diminishing the tax base. Finally, states with abundant
wetlands and strong environmental safeguards are likely to attract
people that share preferences for these resources, and who would
advocate reinforcing the protections that are in place. In this fashion, interjurisdictional competition should augment environmental
protection rather than undermine it. These explanations for the pattern of wetland protection are speculative, but they are more consonant with the historical evidence than the race-to-the-bottom theory.

B. Spillover Problems
While the threat of a destructive race to the bottom may not provide
a sound justification for federal intervention, the presence of interstate spillovers might. 128 This is particularly the case with transboundary pollution-" a physical externality or spillover that crosses
state lines.11 This sort of interstate externality or spillover effect
must be differentiated from the sort of pecuniary externality that
results from the overuse of an interstate commons or failure to protect an ecological public good. These latter effects are discussed
in the next section.
Pollution that crosses political boundaries is a legitimate federal
concern. Yet despite the dissent's protestations to the contrary, it is
not at all clear that any such spillovers were
in SWANCC.
The question before the court was, explicitly, whether the federal
regulatory authority reached isolated waters that, by definition, are
not hydrologically connected to interstate or otherwise navigable
waterways. There is, therefore, little reason to believe that SWANCC
undermines the federal government's legitimate role in the control
of interstate pollution problems.
The dissent correctly noted that the development of waters that
An advocate of federalism notes that
the inherent difficulties in regulation by any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear
for
regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance."
Thomas W Merrill, Golden
Pollutwn.
Duke L J
(1997).

Id
968-69.
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serve as habitats for migratory birds will, over time, produce measurable impacts in other states. Wetlands, in the words of two comrnentators, "are aptly seen as biological factories" producing wildlife
and other interstate goods. 131 If migratory birds have fewer habitats in
Illinois, there may be fewer such birds in states throughout their
migration path. In this sense, then, the Corps' denial of SWANCC's
permit could be characterized as an effort to control such interstate
externalities.
But this argument proves too much. If SWANCC's development
of hydrologically isolated waters can be regulated because of the
marginal impacts on wildlife populations in other jurisdictions,
then the concept of what constitutes an interstate spillover worthy
of federal regulation begins to lose its analytical utility. Although
migratory birds rely upon wetlands and fly across state lines, letting
this alone establish a basis for federal regulation would obliterate
any limit on federal regulatory authority, as would accepting the argument for federal regulation explicitly rejected in Lopez. The Lopez
dissenters argued that the federal government could regulate the
possession of guns in or near schools because of the potential externalities that guns in schools could disrupt the educational process,
thereby depressing the earning potential or productivity of the future labor force and dramatically affecting the nation's econmnic future. Much as wetlands are "biological factories" to be regulated
like industrial factories, schools could be seen as the factories that
produce future workers and managers. But this was not enough to
justify the regulation in Lopez.
Alteration of habitat or other lands that is likely to produce broad
dispersed external effects on other jurisdictions is likely to have
greater effects at the source. Any effects of the SWANCC balefill on
migratory waterfowl populations in Texas are dwarfed by its potential environmental impacts in Cook and Kane Counties, Illinois.
This may explain why local environmental groups intervened on the
side of the Army Corps from the onset of the litigation in the district court. While the dissent characterizes the waste disposal project as generating concentrated local benefits and dispersed costs on
the nation at large, it is more common to characterize waste disposal facilities in the opposite fashion. Landfills, incinerators, and
the like are generally considered "locally undesirable land-uses" or
"LULUs" that impose substantial costs on local residents while providing dispersed benefits to a broader community. In the case of a
landfill, for instance, local residents may suffer from odor, pollution,
or depressed land values, while the broader region benefits from
131
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expensive waste disposal. Such concerns, whether justified on environmental grounds or not, tend to generate strong local opposition
to LULUs-typically referred to as "NIMBYism" for "Not-In-MyBackyard"-or demands for cmnpensation. The strength of these
local responses would suggest that federal intervention is unnecessary to prevent spillovers in many cases.
The problen1 with simply pointing to the presence of an externality is that it can authorize just about any environmental regulation
because an individual's or jurisdiction's environmental decision often can displease someone else. A more reasonable standard is based
upon the sort of tangible spillover effects that would be actionable
at common law, such as emitting pollutants upstream, blocking water flow, and modifying river currents so as to induce flowing. Where
transaction costs or political difficulties prevent states from engaging in Coasian bargaining or establishing interstate compacts, federal intervention to address such concerns may be warranted. 1M Regulating any land-use that could have a marginal impact on the
greater ecosystem is not. Ironically, were it not for the CWA itself,
states might have greater recourse to federal common law for redress
of more serious interstate pollution.
The decision in SWANCC, although it limits federal regulatory
authority, does not limit the federal governmenes regulatory authority over navigable waters that have substantial interstate characteristics, including wetlands. The Court's majority found the CWA to
distinguish between the protection of water resources that are clearly
interstate in character and those that are not. This affirms the federal role in controlling interstate environmental matters without
justifying the regulation of anything that could conceivably generate
an interstate externality.
The decision therefore affirn1s the econmnies of
perfor
Richard A. Epstein, Waste
the Dormant Lo.mn1en:e
3 Green Bag 2d
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that local externalities from waste
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1
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haps the ecologies of scale-that characterize different environmental concerns. The local and regional nature of many environmental
problems means that local knowledge and expertise is necessary to
develop proper solutions. While pollution of a small, intrastate pond
may create ripple effects on environmental resources in other states,
the ecological life of that pond is still locally concentrated. Wetlands
vary in type and function dramatically throughout the country. Local wetland protection programs can, and often do, take account of
local conditions. In the words of one state wetland official, "Okeechobee County doesn't need to worry about mangrove estuaries.
Dade doesn't need to worry about phosphate. Leon doesn't need to
worry about the Everglades." The diversity of state freshwater protection efforts reflects "the diversity of freshwater wetland types
across the nation and state preferences."
It should also be noted that direct federal efforts to control physical spillover problems have been rather limited. Only in recent years
has the Environmental Protection Agency responded to concerns
about interstate air pollution under the Clean Air Act. Although
the Clean Water Act also authorizes EPA regulation of interstate
water problems, these provisions are rarely invoked.
Federal neglect of transboundary pollution suggests one of two conclusions.
First, transboundary pollution may be mostly a relatively minor
concern. Assuming that the impacts of pollution are generally most
acute at or near the source, absent a race to the bottom most states
and localities will act to address local environmental concerns before they generate substantial spillovers. 140 The second alternative
is that the federal government is simply ineffectual at controlling
interstate pollution, due either to special-interest pressures at the
federal level or to institutional incapacity. Either explanation of federal failure to control transboundary spillovers reinforces the conclusion that enumerated powers need not be stretched to accommodate expansive regulation in the name of environmental protection.
C. Habitat as a Commons
Not all interstate externalities are the result of pollution crossing
state lines. There also can be externalities in the provision of an
interstate public good, such as wildlife habitat. Local residents will
Hurchalla A
at 260 (cited in note 126).
Kusler/
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not capture all of the benefits of their state's decision to create or
protect local wildlife habitat. Individuals in other states who care
about the survival of a species and those who wish to observe, hunt,
or otherwise derive satisfaction from the prospering of the species
also will benefit. This is particularly true in the case of habitat for
migratory birds, the benefits of which are spread throughout their
Inigratory range.
Because other states will free ride on a state's provision of habitat,
there is understandable concern that states will protect a suboptimal amount of habitat. Just as private firms in a competitive market
normally will undersupply goods that produce benefits for which
they cannot charge, states in a federalist systen1 would be expected
to underproduce goods, such as wildlife habitat, whose benefits are
enjoyed by taxpayers in other states.
The public-good characteristics of isolated waters that serve as
habitat for migratory species could provide a rational basis for federal intervention, but it is not clear of what kind. Governments provide most public goods, from lighthouses and courts to police and
national defense, through their powers to tax and spend. Government does not require landowners to donate the use of their land for
military installations. Instead, the government levies taxes and uses
the revenue to purchase what is needed for national defense, in rare
cases through the power of eminent domain.
If wetlands are a public good because they provide habitat for migratory birds, limiting the federal government's ability to regulate
the use of wetlands does not prevent the government from rectifying
the suboptimal provision of wildlife habitat. The Commerce Clause
limitation on federal regulatory authority under SWANCC does not
meaningfully limit the use of the spending clause. Congress is as
able to appropriate money for wetland conservation after SWANCC
as it was at the height of the New Deal era.
There is ample evidence that spending programs can effectively
subsidize the creation and protection of wetlands. Federal support
for the protection of waterfowl habitat dates back some seventy
years to the sale of "duck stamps" to hunters that created a dedicated source of revenue for conservation of an estimated 4.5 million
acres. 141 Today there are several programs that subsidize wetland conservation and restoration, including the Fish & Wildlife Service's Partners for Wildlife program, the North American Waterfowl Management Plan created in 1986, and the Wetland Reserve Program. Under
programs 1
federal govern1nent enters into private agreeKarkkaincn,
n.l90 (1997).
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ments with landowners to restore wetlands on their property, while
subsidizing the cost of restoration and the purchase of a permanent
or multi-year easement to ensure that the wetland is protected. In
1995, these three programs restored an estimated 48,000 acres,
42,000 acres, and 118,000 acres of wetlands respectively, for a total
of over 200,000 acres of restored wetlands in a single year. This
compares favorably with an esti1nated average gross wetland loss
rate of 156,000 acres per year from 1982-1992. The cost of these
programs is relatively low-typically
than $1,000 per acre, including the cost of restoration, technical assistance and the purchase of an easement.
Relying upon the federal spending power to provide environmental goods such as wildlife habitat also reduces the potential for regional rent-seeking. Federal regulation can enable one constituency
to impose its policy preferences on another at minimal cost. States
with strong 11 pro-wetland" sentiment, but few wetlands, are likely
to support greater regulation of wetlands nationwide as they will
receive the benefit of having their preference for more wetlands fulfilled without bearing the costs. Even if it is assumed that wetlands
generate positive externalities that are evenly distributed nationwide, such as larger populations of migratory waterfowl, regional
disparities in the concentration of wetlands can lead to regional
rent-seeking, as the costs of preserving wetlands are concentrated on
those areas that have the most desirable ecological characteristics.
Forcing the federal government to pay for the creation or conservation of wetlands reduces this problem, as both the costs and benefits
of providing the environmental benefits are more widely dispersed.
It is important to note that simply because something meets the
traditional economic definition of a public good, this does not mean
that it will not be provided privately. Many people place substanJonathan Tolman, Swamped: How America
'No Net
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tial value on the existence of species or the preservation of habitat
and are willing to invest their time, Inoney and effort in ensuring
that certain species survive. In the ease of migratory waterfowl, the
most obvious exatnple of this phenomenon is Ducks Unlimited
(DU). According to the
own
it has restored and
protected over 9 million acres of waterfowl habitat in North Arnerica. Other, smaller and less-well-known groups engage in si1nilar
activities, as do some corporations. Individuals and corporations
also can receive tax deductions for their contributions to such efforts, which may offset public goods proble1ns. Even if this private
activity does not fully offset under-provision of habitat due to its
public good characteristics/ it should be considered when assessing
the need for federal intervention.
IV. THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM
Faced with the prospect of having to defend its federalism jurisprudence from the environmental challenge, the Supreme Court ducked.
Whereas in
and Morrison the Court rnajority articulated the
rationale for 1naintaining substantive limits on federal regulatory
authorit~ in SWANCC the Court simply said that
had not
(yet) pushed Constitutional bounds.
One reason for the Court's apparent reluctance to re-articulate
the rationale for its federalist jurisprudence n1ay have been the submatter. The rhetoric of the
and Morrison dissents aside,
there was little doubt that the provisions struck down in either case
were not
to address a pressing national concern. Few believe
that the solution to school violence or don1estic abuse was to be found
in the
of the federal code at issue in
or Morrison.
Gun possession and domestic violence are not traditional subjects of
federal control. In fact, the Saine interstate competitive dynamic that
could, at least theoreticall)j generate a race to the bottom in environmental
is likely to produce the opposite
in the
context of crin1inallaw. The interjurisdictional race "cuts the opposite
as states benefit frmn increasing, not
the stringency of criininallaws. Whereas tightening economic regulations
theoretically
driving industry to other states, strengthening
criininal codes and increasing law enforcen1ent, at least with respect
Ducks Unlimited, Fact
March 24, 200 l)
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to violent or property crimes will, if anything, encourage tnore lawfamilies to migrate to the state and encourage prospective
criminals to migrate to other states with less stringent standards.
By contrast, since the early 1970s, the federal governn1ent
played an increasing role in addressing environmental concerns. In
the wake of the first Earth Day, Congress enacted major statutes to
address air and water quality, solid waste, drinking water, endangered species, and abandoned hazardous waste sites. Whatever the
other limits of federal authority, there is a pervasive belief that the
federal government has a substantial role to play in addressing environmental concerns. Rather than confront this belief the court rested
its decision on statutory grounds.
It is perfectly appropriate for the Court to avoid reaching unnecessary constitutional matters. In the case of the CWA, the statutory
language was sufficiently opaque to resolve SWANCC on statutory
grounds. This will not be so in the future. While Commerce Clause
challenges to federal regulatory authority under the CWA may be
off the table for the time being, challenges to other statutes are under way.
Perhaps the most likely area where the Court will be forced to
confront the environmental challenge to federalism is the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Under section 9(a)( 1) of the ESA, it is unlawful for any person to u take'' any species listed as endangered"
under the Act. To "take" a listed species tneans "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt
to engage in any such conduct.
This prohibition applies on all
private lands, and has the effect of requiring private landowners to
While those unfamiliar
provide habitat for endangered species.
with the ESA might think that it primarily protects large, wideu•J.L'-'-.I.U."-
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ranging
such as bald eagles, mountain lions, and
most listed species are actually rather small species, n1any of
which do not travel at all. Indeed, there are listed species that do
not exist in 1nore than one state.
Since
there
Con1merce Clause challenges to the application of the ESA's "take" prohibition to intrastate
including cases, like
that involve activities and habitats that are completely contained within a given state.
In Gibbs v. Babbitt, two North Carolina landowners and two counties challenged a federal plan to reintroduce red wolves in Dare and
Tyrell Counties. By 1998, an estiinated 75 wolves were in the state.
Although originally introduced on federal land, most were believed
to be on private land. To support the reintroduction effort, the Fish
and Wildlife Service promulgated regulations barring the "taking"
of red wolves by private individuals. Violators are subject to both
civil and criminal penalties. Plaintiffs challenged the federal 'taking" regulations under the Commerce Clause. Regulating the capture or killing of wolves on private land, they contend, is not the
regulation of commerce among the several states. The court nevertheless found that the killing of wolves to protect livestock or other
animals and the potential revival of the 19th century practice of
hunting wolves for their pelts related to commercial activities.
These rationales for regulation would seem to press against the lin1its of the Commerce Clause as defined in Lopez and Morrison.
Home
v. Babbitt 1s8 presented
National Association
an even more questionable assertion of federal regulatory authority
to protect endangered species. This case concerned federal efforts to
protect the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, which was placed on the
endangered species list in 1993. Federal prohibition on "taking"
delayed construction of a hospital and local road improveInents. Several trade associations and local governments launched
a Commerce Clause challenge to this regulation because the habitat
for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly "is located entirely within
1
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an eight mile radius in southwestern San Bernardino County and
northwestern Riverside County, California." 161
In both Gibbs and NAHB, divided circuit court panels upheld the
federal regulation and the Supreme Court denied subsequent review.
The regulatory scope of the ESA makes subsequent challenges likely,
bringing the conflict between federal environmental regulation and
federalism to bear. In the ESA context, there is no means to avoid
the constitutional issue through an appeal to unclear statutory language. Regulating activities that may harm endangered species on
private land is not geographically limited in the way that Corps' regulation under section 404 is limited to "waters of the United States."
If Lopez and Morrison are taken seriously, it will not be easy to
distinguish the "taking" of wolves or flies on private land from the
possession of a gun near a school. It is certainly true that the motivation for taking a wolf or a fly may be commercial, as when a rancher
kills a wolf to protect livestock, or a developer destroys a fly while
constructing a building. But it is equally true that one might have a
commercial motive for possessing a gun near a school, as was the
case in Lopez itself. The mere fact that one might have a commercial motivation for violating a regulation cannot be enough to make
it a regulation of interstate commerce. Nor does it seem that preventing wolves and flies from being taken is "an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." 16' The purpose of the ESA is to protect endangered species,
not to regulate their economic use.
Contrary to the fears of some, there is no more reason to think
that restricting the application of the ESA must threaten protection
of endangered species than that the outcmne in SWANCC need undermine protection of wetlands. For example, states have an incentive to act to capture tourism benefits from endangered species populations. The interstate externalities of species protection are, if
anything, less than those of wetlands protection, since wetlands or
waters that are a part of a larger hydrological system pose the potential for generating transboundary spillovers of the sort that would
justify federal regulation. Finally, insofar as species are a public
good, they can be provided for in much the same 1nanner as wetNAIJB, L10 F3d
1043.
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lands or waterfowl habitat through federal recourse to the spending
power.
CONCLUSION
Environmental advocates view the Supren1e Court's
interest
in federalisn1 and enumerated powers with trepidation. Liiniting
federal power, they fear, inevitably lirnits environn1ental protection.
Yet the traditional arguments for federal involve1nent in n1any environmental concerns lack theoretical or e1npirical support.
1s
no need for federal regulation to prevent a "race to the bottom or
to respond to every conceivable interstate externality. If the protection of environn1ental resources in1poses local costs hut truly national benefits, the spending power, not the commerce power is the
appropriate tool to
such problen1s.
Should the Supren1e Court continue down its present path, it will
inevitably confront the environmental implications of its federalist
jurisprudence. There will not always be ambiguous statutory language or smne other means to avoid addressing the environmentalist
reservations about li1niting federal regulatory power. When such a
case arises, the Court will have to respond. The Court need not turn
its back on either its federalist principles or the nation's conservation heritage, for the two can be reconciled. When this lesson is
learned, the environmental challenge to federalism will be met.
1

